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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal extraction and taxation of nonrenewable natural resources.
It is well known that the market values of the main strategic resources such as oil, natural
gas, uranium, copper,..., etc, fluctuate randomly following global and seasonal macroeconomic
parameters, these values are modeled using Markov switching Le´vy processes. We formulate
this problem as a differential game. The two players of this differential game are the mining
company whose aim is to maximize the revenues generated from its extracting activities and
the government agency in charge of regulating and taxing natural resources. We prove the
existence of a Nash equilibrium. The corresponding Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs equations are
completely solved and the value functions as well as the optimal extraction and taxation rates
are derived in closed-form. A Numerical example is presented to illustrate our findings.
Keywords: Natural Resource Economics, Le´vy Processes, Stochastic Differential Games, Markov
Switching, Closed-form Solutions.
1 Introduction
Natural resources have always been the main sources of income for some developing countries.
The extraction of natural resources in developing countries is usually done by multinational cor-
porations. The revenues generated from the sales of these resources in world markets as well as
the taxes those countries levy on multinational mining companies accounted for more than half
of the budget of those resource-rich developing countries. Thus, the production and regulation of
strategic natural resources have always been one of the prime topics of discussion in political and
scientific circles.
The earliest scientific contribution on the extraction of natural resources was obtained in the thirties
by Hotelling [18], he derived an optimal extraction policy under the assumption that the commod-
ity price is constant. A wide range of economists have extended the Hotelling model by taking
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into account the uncertainty when modeling commodity prices, for instance Gibson and Schwartz
[14], Schwartz [32] and Cortazar et al. [10] used stochastic mean reverting models for commodity
prices. One can cite the work of Pindyck [30, 31], Hanson [16], Lin and Wagner [21], Gaudet [13],
Luo and Zhao [23] for various extensions of the basic Hotelling model. Cherian et al. [8] studied
the optimal extraction of nonrenewable resources as a stochastic optimal control problem with two
state variables, the commodity price and the size of the remaining reserve. They solved the control
problem numerically by using Markov chain approximation methods. Recently Aleksandrov et al.
[2] studied the optimal production of oil as an American-style real option and used Monte-Carlo
methods to approximate the optimal production rate when the oil price follows a mean-reverting
process.
The taxation of natural resources has also generated a great deal of interest in the academic litera-
ture. One can cite the work of Beals et al. [6] on tax and investment policies for hard minerals and
the contributions of Heaps and Helliwell [17], and Bhattacharyya [7] on efficient tax policies for
natural resources and energy, Lin and Prince [22] on optimal gas tax in California.
The extraction and taxation of natural resources are in fact two sides of the same coin when it
comes to generating revenues for the public finances of resource-rich developing countries. How-
ever, throughout the scientific literature these issues have usually been treated separately. The main
contribution of this work is that we treat these problems in their natural setting by highlighting the
interplay between extraction and taxation policies for strategic resources. We use the framework
of noncooperative differential games to tackle these issues. We formulate this problem as a dif-
ferential game where the two players are the multinational mining company and the government.
Obviously the multinational company wants to maximize its share of profits from the sales of the
extracted resource in commodity exchange markets and the government also wants to maximize
its share of profits from the sales of the extracted resource as well as the income tax it levies on the
multinational company. Pemy [28] studied the extraction and taxation of oil using mean-reverting
regime switching Le´vy processes to capture global disruptions in oil market and used the viscosity
solution framework to estimate the optimal extraction and taxation rates. It is also self evident that
commodity prices in exchange markets fluctuate following various macro-economical and global
geopolitical forces. It is therefore important to take into account the random dynamic of the com-
modity value when solving the optimal extraction and taxation problems.
In this paper, we use regime switching Le´vy processes to model commodity prices. Regime switch-
ing models have been extensively used in the financial economics literature since their introduction
by Hamilton [15]. Many authors have studied the control of systems that involve regime switch-
ing using a hidden Markov chain and/or jumps diffusions, one can cite Øksendal and Sulem [25],
Biswas et al. [5], Davis et al. [11], Bayraktar et al. [4], Pemy [26, 27, 29] among others.
In this of this work, we study the evolution of a production sharing agreement between a multi-
national mining company and the government of a resource-rich country using the framework of
stochastic noncoorperative differential game. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium and
derive the value functions as well as the optimal extraction and taxation policies in closed-form.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we formulate the problem under consider-
ation. In Section 3, we proof the existence of the Nash equilibrium. In section 4, we derive the
value functions and the optimal strategies. A Finally, in section 5, we present a numerical example
that illustrates our results.
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2 Problem formulation
Consider a company which has a Production Sharing Agreement with the government of a country
rich in natural resources. The agreement is for the extraction of a nonrenewable natural resource.
Both parties will share the profits from the sales of the mineral on world markets following a
simple rule where the company takes 100θ percent and the government 100(1 − θ) percent of the
profits, for some θ ∈ (0, 1). We assume that the mining lease is a long term contract, thus we
use the infinite time horizon framework to model this long term contract. Let Xt be the value of
nonrenewable resource at time t. Given that commodity values are very sensitive to global macro-
economical and geopolitical shocks, we model Xt as a regime switching Le´vy process with two
states. Let α(t) ∈ M = {1, ...,m} be a finite state Markov chain that captures the state of the
commodity marketplace. Let (ηt)t be a Le´vy process and let N be the Poisson random measure
of (ηt)t, N(t, U) =
∑
0<s≤t 1U(ηs − ηs−) for any Borel set U ⊂ R. Moreover, let ν be the Le´vy
measure of (ηt)t we have ν(U) = E[N(1, U)] for any Borel set U ⊂ R. The differential form of
N is denoted by N(dt, dz), we define the differential N¯(dt, dz) as follows
N¯(dt, dz) =
 N(dt, dz)− ν(dz)dt if |z| < 1N(dt, dz) if |z| ≥ 1.
We model the evolution of the profit sharing agreement as a differential game where the two players
are the mining company and the government. Each player acting as a controller will to maximize
its own profit throughout the duration of the contract. The mining company will try to maximize
its share of profits from the sales of mineral in world markets, while the government will also
try to maximize both its share of the profits from the sales of mineral in world markets and the
income tax it levies on the mining company. We denote the mining company as Player 1 and the
government as Player 2. We assume that the process X(t) follows the dynamical system
dX(t) = [X(t)µ(α(t))− ρu1]dt+ σ(α(t))X(t)dW (t)
+X(t)
∫
R
γ(α(t))zN¯(dt, dz)
)
,
X(0) = x ≥ 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞,
(2.1)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1) captures the relative impact of the extracting activities, u1(t) ∈ U1 = [0, u¯1] is
the extraction rate chosen by the company and u2(t) ∈ U2 = [u2, u¯2] is the tax rate chosen by the
government. Note that u¯2 can be seen as the maximum tax rate that can be levied on any company,
this value is assumed to be known by both players, it comes naturally that u¯2 < 1. The main idea
we want to capture with the control ut(·) is that the government may decide to give some tax breaks
or exonerations to mining companies because of various macro-economical or political reasons in
that case u2(t) represents the effective tax rate imposed to the mining company at time t. It is also
common that governments sometimes give tax subsidies to various industries for a wide range of
political reasons, in order to capture that other possibility, the lowest possible tax rate that can be
imposed to the mining company u2 can take negative values, −1 < u2 ≤ 0. We assume that for
each state i ∈ M, µ(i), σ(i) and γ(i) are known constants, they respectively represent the rate of
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return, volatility and jump intensity. The processes u1(t) and u2(t) are control variables, and W (t)
is the Wiener process defined on a probability space (Ω,F , P ). Moreover, we assume that W (t),
ηt and α(t) are independent. The generator of this Markov chain isQ = (qij)ij , with qij ≥ 0, i 6= j,
qii = −
∑
j 6=i qij .
Remark 2.1. Our commodity pricing model (2.1) covers two main possibilities.
1. If the country is a small or medium size producer, then the extraction rate will not affect the
global price of the commodity, thus ρ = 0 and the dynamic of Xt becomes
dX(t) = X(t)
(
µ(α(t))dt+ σ(α(t))dW (t)
+
∫
R
γ(α(t))zN¯(dt, dz)
)
, (2.2)
2. If the country is a major producer that really influences the global price of the commodity
such as Saudi Arabia is for oil, then the parameters ρ > 0. So the extracting policies will
directly influence the drift.
It is well known that for any Lebesgue measurable control u1(·) and u2(·), taking values on
compact sets [0, u¯1] and [u2, u¯2] respectively, the equation (2.1) has a unique solution, such control
processes will be called admissible controls. For more, one can refer to Øksendal and Sulem [25].
For each initial data (x, i) we denote by Uj(x, i) the set of admissible controls which is just the
set of all controls uj(·) taking values in Uj such that X(0) = x, α(0) = i and which are {Ft}t≥0-
adapted where Ft = σ{α(ξ), η(ξ),W (ξ); ξ ≤ t}, j = 1, 2.
Let C(u1) be the extraction cost function, we assume that this function depends only on the
extraction rate u1. In modeling the extraction cost function, we assume naturally that the extraction
cost function is proportional to the production function. Thus we will use production function
models to specify the extraction cost function. One of the popular production function is the
quadratic production function. This is due to its simplicity and the fact that it captures most stages
of the production cycle. Therefore we will assume that our cost function C(u1) has the same form
as a quadratic production function. Thus, we set
C(u1) = au
2
1, a > 0.
For more on production function models one can refer to Houthakker [19], Filipe and Adams [12],
Humphrey [20], Mankin [24] and Taylor [35].
The total profit rate for operating the mine is
P (x, u1) = xu1 − C(u1).
The mining company pre-tax profit rate function is θP (x, u1). The government profit rate without
the tax revenue is (1 − θ)P (x, u1). The total income tax the government levies on the mining
company is u2θP (x, u1). The post-tax profit rate of the company is
L1(x, u1, u2) = θP (x, u1)(1− u2),
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and the government profit rate function is
L2(x, u1, u2) = (1− θ)P (x, u1) + u2θP (x, u1).
Given a discount rate r > 0, the payoff of each player j = 1, 2 is defined as follows;
Jj(x, i;u1, u2)
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtLj(X(t), Y (t), u1(t), u2(t))dt
∣∣∣∣X(0) = x, α(0) = i].
It is obvious each player wants to maximize its own payoff. The company will try to maximize
its payoff by adjusting the extraction rate u1(·), while the government will maximize its payoff by
changing the tax rate u2(·) following the changes in the commodity price X(t). This is therefore
the setting of a noncooperative game. Our goal is to find a noncooperative Nash equilibrium
(u∗1, u
∗
2) such that
J1(x, i;u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ≥ J1(x, i;u1, u∗2), (2.3)
for all u1(·) ∈ U1(x, i),
J2(x, i;u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ≥ J2(x, i;u∗1, u2), (2.4)
for all u2(·) ∈ U2(x, i).
3 Nash Equilibrium
Definition 3.1. Let (u∗1, u∗2) be a Nash equilibrium of our differential game, the functions
V1(x, i) = sup
u1∈U1
J1(x, i;u1, u
∗
2)
V2(x, i) = sup
u2∈U2
J2(x, i;u
∗
1, u2)
are called value functions of Player 1 and Player 2 respectively.
In order to find the optimal strategies u∗1 and u
∗
2 of the Nash equilibrium we first have to derive
the value functions V1 and V2 of the differential game, then derive the optimal strategies. Formally
the value functions V1 and V2 should satisfy the Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs equations. Assuming that
we have a Nash equilibrium u∗1 and u
∗
2 let us define corresponding Hamiltonians:
H1(x, i, V,
∂V
∂x
,
∂2V
∂x2
)
= rV − sup
u1∈U1
(
1
2
x2σ2(i)
∂2V
∂x2
+ (xµ(i)− ρu1)∂V
∂x
+
∫
R
(
V (x+ γ(i)zx, i)− V (x, i)− 1{|z|<1}(z)∂V
∂x
γ(i)xz
)
ν(dz)
+L1(x, u1, u
∗
2) +QV (x, ·)(i)
)
, (3.1)
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and
H2(x, i, V,
∂V
∂x
,
∂V
∂y
,
∂2V
∂x2
)
= rV − sup
u2∈U2
(
1
2
x2σ2(i)
∂2V
∂x2
+ (xµ(i)− ρu∗1)
∂V
∂x
+
∫
R
(
V (x+ γ(i)xz, y, i)− V (x, i)− 1{|z|<1}(z)∂V
∂x
γ(i)zx
)
ν(dz)
+L2(x, u
∗
1, u2) +QV (x, ·)(i)
)
, (3.2)
where
QV (x, ·)(i) = ∑j 6=i qij[V (x, j)− V (x, i)].
The corresponding Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs equations of this noncooperative game are
H1
(
s, x, i, V1,
∂V1
∂x
,
∂2V1
∂x2
)
= 0
H2
(
s, x, i, V2,
∂V2
∂x
,
∂2V2
∂x2
)
= 0.
(3.3)
We define µ˜1 := (xµ(i) − ρu1), L˜1 := L1(x, u1, u∗2), µ˜2 := (xµ(i) − ρu∗1), L˜2 := L2(x, u∗1, u2),
we have the following result.
Theorem 3.2. Assume that there exists (u∗1, u∗2) ∈ U1×U2 such that the nonlinear Hamilton Jacobi
Isaacs equations (3.3) have classical solutions Vj(x, i), j = 1, 2,
u∗j = arg max
(
µ˜j
∂Vj
∂x
+ L˜j
)
, j = 1, 2. (3.4)
Then the pair (u∗1, u
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium solution and Jj(x, i;u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = Vj(x, i), j = 1, 2.
Proof The proof relies on the fact that this problem can be uncoupled and solved as an optimal
control problem. In fact, if we already have u∗2(·), then the differential game problem becomes an
optimal control problem with the only control variable u1(·) the HJB equation of this new control
problem is in fact
H1
(
x, i,W1,
∂W1
∂x
,
∂2W1
∂x2
)
= 0. (3.5)
Following the assumptions of the Theorem, it is clear that the HJB equation (3.5) has a solution
V1 and the optimal policy of this new control problem is u∗1. Therefore u
∗
1 is in equilibrium with
u∗2 and V1 is the value function of Player 1. A similar argument can be used to show that u
∗
2 is in
equilibrium with u∗1 and that V2 is the value function of Player 2. unionsqu
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4 Closed-form Solutions
The following theorem presents the main result of this paper.
Theorem 4.1. Assume that there exists a Nash equilibrium (u∗1, u∗2) such that u∗2 is an open loop
control, in other terms, u∗2 does not depend on the variable x. Then the solutions of the Hamilton
Jacobi Isaacs equations (3.3) are
V1(x, i) = A1(i)x
2, V2 = A2(i)x
2, i = 1, 2, ...,m. (4.1)
Player 1 optimal strategy is
u∗1(x, i) =
(
1
2a
− ρA1(i)
aθ(1− u∗2(i))
)
x, (4.2)
thus u∗1(x, i) can be expressed as u
∗
1(x, i) = K(i)x.
Player 2 optimal strategy is
u∗2(i) =
 u¯2 if K(i)− aK(i)
2 > 0,
u2 if K(i)− aK(i)2 < 0.
(4.3)
Moreover, the coefficients A1(i), i = 1, 2, ...,m satisfy the system of quadratic equations
A1(i)
2 ρ
2
aθ(1− u∗2(i))
+ A1(i)
(
σ(i)2 − r + 2µ(i)−
∑
j 6=i
qij − ρ
a∫
R
(
2γ(i)z + γ(i)2z2 − 1{|z|<1}(z)2γ(i)z
)
ν(dz)
)
(4.4)
+
θ(1− u∗2(i))
4a
+
∑
j 6=i
qijA1(j) = 0, i = 1, 2, ....,m,
and the coefficients A2(i), i = 1, 2, ...,m satisfy the following linear system
0 = A2(i)
(
σ(i)2 − r + 2(µ(i)− ρK(i))−
∑
j 6=i
qij
+
∫
R
(
2γ(i)z + γ(i)2z2 − 1{|z|<1}(z)2γ(i)z
)
ν(dz)
)
(4.5)
+(K(i)− aK(i)2)(1− θ + θu¯21{K(i)−aK(i)2>0}
+θu21{K(i)−aK(i)2<0}) +
∑
j 6=i
qijA2(j), i = 1, 2, ...,m.
Proof In order to solve (3.3), we will seek solutions in the form
V1(x, i) = A1(i)x
2, V2 = A2(i)x
2. (4.6)
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Therefore, we should have
0 = rA1(i)x
2 − sup
u1∈U1
[
x2σ2(i)A1(i) + 2(xµ(i)− ρu1)xA1(i)
+A1(i)x
2
∫
R
(
(1 + γ(i)z)2 − 1− 1{|z|<1}(z)2γ(i)z
)
ν(dz) (4.7)
+θ(xu1 − au21)(1− u∗2) +
∑
j 6=i
qij[(A1(j)− A1(i))x2]
]
,
and
0 = rA2(i)x
2 − sup
u2∈U2
[
x2σ2(i)A2(i) + 2(xµ(i)− ρu∗1)xA2(i) +
A2(i)x
2
∫
R
(
(1 + γ(i)z)2 − 1− 1{|z|<1}(z)2γ(i)z
)
ν(dz) (4.8)
+(1− θ + u2θ)(xu∗1 − a(u∗1)2) +
∑
j 6=i
qij[(A2(j)− A2(i))x2]
]
.
For the optimality, it is necessary to have
−2ρxA1(i) + θ(x− 2au1)(1− u∗2) = 0. (4.9)
Therefore we should set
u∗1(x, i) =
(
1
2a
− ρA1(i)
aθ(1− u∗2)
)
x. (4.10)
Moreover, given that the operator H2 is a linear function u2, thus the control u2(·) will necessary
be a bang-bang control depending on the sign of the quantity
θ(x(u∗1)− a(u∗1)2) = θ(K(i)− aK(i)2)x2, (4.11)
where K is such that u∗1(x, i) = K(i)x. It is clear that when u
∗
1 is specified then u
∗
2 can be obtained
as follows
u∗2(x, i) =
 u¯2 if K(i)− aK(i)
2 > 0
u2 if K(i)− aK(i)2 < 0.
(4.12)
It comes from (4.12) that u∗2 is independent of the variable of x, so u
∗
2(x, i) ≡ u∗2(i).
Plugging u∗1 in (4.7) we obtain
0 = −rA1(i)x2 + x2σ2(i)A1(i) + x2
∑
j 6=i
qij[(A1(j)− A1(i))]
+2x2
(
µ(i)− ρ( 1
2a
− ρA1(i)
aθ(1− u∗2)
))
A1(i)
+A1(i)x
2
∫
R
(
(1 + γ(i)z)2 − 1− 1{|z|<1}(z)2γ(i)z
)
ν(dz) (4.13)
+x2θ
( 1
2a
− ρA1(i)
aθ(1− u∗2)
)
ig[1− a( 1
2a
− ρA1(i)
aθ(1− u∗2)
)
ig](1− u∗2).
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After simplifying (4.13) we get
0 = −rA1(i) + σ2(i)A1(i) +
∑
j 6=i
qij(A1(j)− A1(i))
+2µ(i)A1(i)− ρA1(i)
a
+
2ρ2A1(i)
2
aθ(1− u∗2)
+A1(i)
∫
R
(
(1 + γ(i)z)2 − 1− 1{|z|<1}(z)2γ(i)z
)
ν(dz)
+
θ(1− u∗2)
4a
− ρ
2A1(i)
2
aθ(1− u∗2)
,
0 = A1(i)
2 ρ
2
aθ(1− u∗2)
+ A1(i)
(
σ(i)2 − r + 2µ(i)−
∑
j 6=i
qij − ρ
a∫
R
(
2γ(i)z + γ(i)2z2 − 1{|z|<1}(z)2γ(i)z
)
ν(dz)
)
(4.14)
+
θ(1− u∗2)
4a
+
∑
j 6=i
qijA1(j), i = 1, 2, ...,m.
Similarly, given u∗1 and using the fact from (4.10) that u
∗
1 is of the form u
∗(x, i) = K(i)x and
plugging the corresponding expression of u∗2(i) from (4.12) in (4.8) we get
0 = −rA2(i)x2 + x2σ2(i)A2(i) + 2(µ(i)− ρK(i))x2A2(i) +
A2(i)x
2
∫
R
(
(1 + γ(i)z)2 − 1− 1{|z|<1}(z)2γ(i)z
)
ν(dz)
+x2(K(i)− aK(i)2)(1− θ + θu¯21{K(i)−aK(i)2>0} (4.15)
+θu21{K(i)−aK(i)2<0}) + x
2
∑
j 6=i
qij(A2(j)− A2(i)).
After simplifying (4.15) we obtain
0 = A2(i)
(
σ(i)2 − r + 2(µ(i)− ρK(i))−
∑
j 6=i
qij
+
∫
R
(
2γ(i)z + γ(i)2z2 − 1{|z|<1}(z)2γ(i)z
)
ν(dz)
)
(4.16)
+(K(i)− aK(i)2)(1− θ + θu¯21{K(i)−aK(i)2>0}
θu21{K(i)−aK(i)2<0}) +
∑
j 6=i
qijA2(j), i = 1, 2, ...,m.
In fact, (4.16) is a system of linear equations. unionsqu
Remark 4.2. Let us set
P (i) = σ(i)2 − r + 2(µ(i)− ρK(i))−
∑
j 6=i
qij
+
∫
R
(
2γ(i)z + γ(i)2z2 − 1{|z|<1}(z)2γ(i)z
)
ν(dz), i = 1, 2, ...,m, (4.17)
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and
R(i) = −(K(i)− aK(i)2)(1− θ + θu¯21{K(i)−aK(i)2>0}
+θu21{K(i)−aK(i)2<0}), i = 1, 2, ....,m. (4.18)
In the particular case of a two-state Markov chain, the system (4.16) becomes P (1)A2(1) + q12A2(2) = R(1),q21A2(1) + P (2)A2(2) = R(2),
and the solutions are
A2(1) =
R(1)P (2)− q12R(2)
P (1)P (2)− q12q21 , (4.19)
A2(2) =
P (1)R(2)− q21R(1)
P (1)P (2)− q12q21 . (4.20)
Now, let us study the problem at hand in the particular case where the Le´vy measure follows
an exponential distribution. We assume that the Le´vy measure is of the form
ν(dz) =
 ηe
−ηzdz if z ≥ 0,
0 if z < 0,
for some η > 0.
Given that we have specified the form of the Le´vy measure, we can now simplify (4.14) and (4.16).
Thus when the Le´vy measure is exponential, the coefficients A1(i) should satisfy the quadratic
equation
0 = A1(i)
2 ρ
2
aθ(1− u∗2)
+ A1(i)
(
σ(i)2 − r + 2µ(i)−
∑
j 6=i
qij − ρ
a∫ ∞
0
(
2γ(i)z + γ(i)2z2 − 1{|z|<1}(z)2γ(i)z
)
ηe−ηzdz
)
(4.21)
+
θ(1− u∗2)
4a
+
∑
j 6=i
qijA1(j)
0 = A1(i)
2 ρ
2
aθ(1− u∗2)
+ A1(i)
(
σ(i)2 − r + 2µ(i)−
∑
j 6=i
qij − ρ
a
+2γ(i)
γ(i) + (1 + η)ηe−η
η2
)
+
θ(1− u∗2)
4a
+
∑
j 6=i
qijA1(j), i = 1, 2. (4.22)
Moreover, (4.17) can be simplified as follows
P (i) = σ(i)2 − r + 2(µ(i)− ρK(i))−
∑
j 6=i
qij + 2γ(i)
γ(i) + (1 + η)ηe−η
η2
, i = 1, 2,
We summarize these findings in the following corollary.
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Corollary 4.3. If the Le´vy process has finite activity and the Le´vy measure has the form ν(dz) =
ηe−ηzdz, z > 0, for some η > 0, the value functions and the optimal policies obtained in Theo-
rem 4.1 are such that the coefficients A1(i) satisfy the system of quadratic equations
A1(i)
2 ρ
2
aθ(1− u∗2)
+ A1(i)
(
σ(i)2 − r + 2µ(i)−
∑
j 6=i
qij − ρ
a
+2γ(i)
γ(i) + (1 + η)ηe−η
η2
)
+
θ(1− u∗2)
4a
+
∑
j 6=i
qijA1(j) = 0, i = 1, 2, ...m, (4.23)
and in the particular case of a two-state Markov chain, the coefficientsA2(i) are defined as follows
A2(1) =
R(1)P (2)− q12R(2)
P (1)P (2)− q12q21 ,
A2(2) =
P (1)R(2)− q21R(1)
P (1)P (2)− q12q21
with
P (i) = σ(i)2 − r + 2(µ(i)− ρK(i))−
∑
j 6=i
qij + 2γ(i)
γ(i) + (1 + η)ηe−η
η2
, i = 1, 2,
R(i) = −(1− θ + θ(u¯21{K(i)−aK(i)2>0} + u21{K(i)−aK(i)2<0}))(K(i)− aK(i)2), i = 1, 2.
It is well known through empirical evidences that commodity prices follow Le´vy processes with
infinite jumps activity. For more on this finding one can refer to [1] and the references therein. It
is therefore interesting that we cover that aspect of this problem. In this section, we derive optimal
extraction policies when the Le´vy measure is given by
ν(dz) =

e−|z|
|z|2 dz if z 6= 0,
0 if z = 0.
(4.24)
It can be shown easily that the measure defined in (4.24) satisfies the Le´vy-Khintchine formula∫
R
min(|z|2, 1)ν(dz) < ∞ and that
∫
R
ν(dz) = ∞. It comes that the coefficients A1(i), i = 1, 2
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such satisfy the quadratic equations
0 = A1(i)
2 ρ
2
aθ(1− u∗2)
+ A1(i)
(
σ(i)2 − r + 2µ(i)−
∑
j 6=i
qij − ρ
a∫
R
(
2γ(i)z + γ(i)2z2 − 1{|z|<1}(z)2γ(i)z
)e−z
|z|2dz
)
+
θ(1− u∗2)
4a
+
∑
j 6=i
qijA1(j)
= A1(i)
2 ρ
2
aθ(1− u∗2)
+ A1(i)
(
σ(i)2 − r + 2µ(i)−
∑
j 6=i
qij − ρ
a∫
R
2γ(i)z
e−|z|
z2
dz +
∫
R
γ(i)2z2
e−|z|
z2
dz −
∫ 1
−1
2γ(i)z
e−|z|
z2
dz
)
+
θ(1− u∗2)
4a
+
∑
j 6=i
qijA1(j) (4.25)
Consequently we get,
A1(i)
2 ρ
2
aθ(1− u∗2)
+ A1(i)
(
σ(i)2 − r + 2µ(i)−
∑
j 6=i
qij − ρ
a∫ ∞
−∞
2γ(i)
e−|z|
z
dz + 2
∫ ∞
0
γ(i)2e−|z|dz −
∫ 1
−1
2γ(i)
e−|z|
z
dz
)
+
θ(1− u∗2)
4a
+
∑
j 6=i
qijA1(j) = 0.
Which simplifies to
A1(i)
2 ρ
2
aθ(1− u∗2)
+ A1(i)
(
σ(i)2 − r + 2µ(i)−
∑
j 6=i
qij − ρ
a
+2γ(i)2
)
+
θ(1− u∗2)
4a
+
∑
j 6=i
qijA1(j) = 0, i = 1, 2, ...,m. (4.26)
In addition, (4.17) becomes
P (i) = σ(i)2 − r + 2(µ(i)− ρK(i))−
∑
j 6=i
qij + 2γ(i)
2, i = 1, 2, ...,m.
The following corollary summarizes this result.
Corollary 4.4. If the Le´vy process has infinite activity and the Le´vy measure has the form ν(dz) =
e−|z|/|z|2dz, z 6= 0, the value functions and the optimal policies obtained in Theorem 4.1 are such
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that the coefficients A1(i) satisfy the system of quadratic equations
A1(i)
2 ρ
2
aθ(1− u∗2)
+ A1(i)
(
σ(i)2 − r + 2µ(i)−
∑
j 6=i
qij − ρ
a
+2γ(i)2
)
+
θ(1− u∗2)
4a
+
∑
j 6=i
qijA1(j) = 0, i = 1, 2, ...m. (4.27)
and in the particular case of a two-state Markov chain, the coefficientsA2(i) are defined as follows
A2(1) =
R(1)P (2)− q12R(2)
P (1)P (2)− q12q21 , (4.28)
A2(2) =
P (1)R(2)− q21R(1)
P (1)P (2)− q12q21 (4.29)
with
P (i) = σ(i)2 − r + 2(µ(i)− ρK(i))−
∑
j 6=i
qij + 2γ(i)
2, i = 1, 2,
R(i) = −(1− θ + θ(u¯21{K(i)−aK(i)2>0} + u21{K(i)−aK(i)2<0}))(K(i)− aK(i)2), i = 1, 2.
5 Application
In this section we study two cases of the extraction and taxation problems, we will first analyze
the case where the country is medium size produce of the commodity and in the second case we
we analyze the problem when the country is a major producer of the commodity. In both case we
assume that u¯2 = 0.2 and u2 = 0.
5.1 Medium producer
Consider a Profit Sharing Agreement between a medium gold producer and a multinational mining
company where the company takes 30% and the country keeps 70% of the profits, thus θ = 0.3.
Because the country is a medium producer, the country production level will not influence the
commodity price, thus ρ = 0 and the commodity price follows the following SDE
dX(t) = X(t)
(
µ(α(t))dt+ σ(α(t))dWt +
∫
R λ(α(t))zN¯(dt, dz)
)
.
We assume that the gold market has two trends,M = {1, 2}, α(t) = 1 represents the uptrend
and α(t) = 2 represents the downtrend. Moreover we assume, r = 0.02, µ = (0.08,−0.1),
σ = (0.2, 0.3), γ = (0.05, 0.09), and ν(dz) = 5e−5zdz, z > 0. The generator of the Markov chain
α(t) is Q =
( −0.4 0.4
0.1 −0.1
)
. The extraction cost function is C(u) = 15u2, so a = 15. Note that
13
u is in millions of ounces of gold per year, and the unit of the cost function C(u) is millions of
dollars per year. If u∗2 ≡ u¯2 = 0.2 then V1(x, i) = A1(i)x2, i = 1, 2, such that A1(1) and A2(2)
solve the system  −0.2190A1(1) + 0.4A1(2) + 0.004 = 00.1A1(1)− 0.2279A1(2) + 0.004 = 0,
and the solutions are A1(1) = 0.2535 and A1(2) = 0.1288.
and the optimal extraction rates are u∗1(x, 1) = u
∗
1(x, 2) =
1
30
x. If u∗2 ≡ u2 = 0 then A1(1) and
A1(2) solve a slightly different system −0.2190A1(1) + 0.4A1(2) + 0.0050 = 00.1A1(1)− 0.2279A1(2) + 0.0050 = 0,
and A1(1) = 0.3169 and A1(2) = 0.1610. Given that u∗1(x, 1) = u
∗
1(x, 2) =
1
2a
x, thus K(i) = 1
2a
.
It is clear that K(i)− aK(i)2 = 1
2a
− 1
4a
> 0, thus u2(1) = u2(2) = u¯2 = 0.2.
In sum the Nash Equilibrium is
u∗1(x, i) =
1
2a
x, and u∗2(x, i) = u¯2 = 0.2.
5.2 Major Producer
Consider an oil company with an extraction lease of an oil field with a known reserve of M = 10
billion barrels. We assume that the profit sharing agreement between the oil company and the
government is such that the oil company takes 20% of profits and the government takes 80%, so
θ = 0.2. The yearly discount rate r = 0.02, the yearly return vector is µ = (0.02,−0.1), the
yearly volatility vector is σ = (0.2, 0.3), the yearly intensity vector is γ = (0.022, 0.03), and the
generator of the Markov chain is
Q =
( −0.3 0.3
0.5 −0.5
)
.
The parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1) will capture the relative impact of the oil production on the oil price,
in this example ρ = 0.001. The extraction cost function is C(u) = 2u2, so a = 2. Note that,
in the cost function C(u), the argument u is in millions of barrels per year, and the unit of the
cost function C(u) is millions of dollars per year. We assume that the Le´vy measure has infinity
intensity ν(dz) =
e−|z|
|z|2 , z 6= 0.
If u∗2 ≡ u¯2 = 0.2 then
V1(x, i) = A1(i)x
2
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such that A1(1) and A2(2) solve the system 3.125× 10
−6A1(1)2 − 0.239532A1(1) + 0.3A1(2) + 0.02 = 0
3.125× 10−6A1(2)2 − 0.6287A1(2) + 0.5A1(1) + 0.02 = 0.
The acceptable solutions are A1(1) = 37.2674 and A1(2) = 29.6747. In fact this system has
four solution pairs (37.2674, 29.6747), (194.783, 155.06), (76534.2−138910i, 201092+110575i)
and (76534.2 + 138910i, 201092 − 110575i), but only the solution (37.267, 29.674) is such that
u∗1(x, i) ≥ 0 for all x and i. Therefore we have
V1(x, 1) = 37.2674x
2, V1(x, 2) = 29.6747x
2,
u∗1(x, 1) = 0.133539x, u
∗
1(x, 2) = 0.157267x.
It is worth noting that the value function V (x, i) is given in millions of dollars and the extraction
rate u∗(x, i) is given in millions of barrels per year. In fact the daily optimal extraction rate is
u∗1(x), i) =
1
365
( 1
2a
− ρA1(i)
aθ(1− u∗2(i))
)
x,
u1(x, 1) = 0.00036x millions of barrels per day,
u1(x, 2) = 0.00043x millions of barrels per day.
If u∗2 ≡ u2 = 0, then the coefficients A1(1) and A1(2) solve the system 2.5× 10
−6A1(1)2 − 0.239532A1(1) + 0.3A1(2) + 0.025 = 0
2.5× 10−6A1(2)2 − 0.6287A1(2) + 0.5A1(1) + 0.025 = 0.
Then acceptable solution is A1(1) = 46.5843 and A1(2) = 37.0934. The value function and
optimal extraction rate are
V1(x, 1) = 46.5843x
2 V1(x, 2) = 37.0934x
2
u∗1(x, 1) = 0.133539x, u
∗
1(x, 2) = 0.157267x.
The daily optimal extraction rates are
u1(x, 1) = 0.00036x millions of barrels per day,
u1(x, 2) = 0.00043x millions of barrels per day.
Likewise, if u∗1(x, i) = K(i)x with K(1) = 0.133539 and K(2) = 0.157267, then the coefficient
A2(1) and A2(2) obtained from (4.28) and (4.29) are
A2(1) = 195.654 and A2(1) = 155.792.
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Thus the value function is
V2(x, 1) = 195.654x
2 and V2(x, 2) = 155.792x2.
The optimal tax rate is u∗2(x, 1) = u
∗
2(x, 2) = u¯2 = 20% becauseK(1)−aK(1)2 = 0.0978738 > 0
and K(2)− aK(2)2 = 0.107801 > 0.
In Figure 1, we represent the value function of player 1 (the mining company) when the market
is up and when the market is down. In Figure 2, we represent the value function of player 2 (the
government) when the market is up and when the market is down.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we study the optimal extraction and taxation of a strategic natural resource. Assum-
ing that the price of the natural resource follows a regime switching Le´vy process, we model this
extraction and taxation problem as a noncooperative stochastic differential game between a multi-
national mining company and the government of a resource-rich nation. we derive closed-form
formulas for the value functions as well as the optimal extraction and taxation policies. We end
this paper by showing how our result can be easily applied in the optimal management of a major
oil field and the efficient taxation of a multinational oil corporation.
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